Confederate attack; and the intrepidity of a wounded Chamberlain and his men, who run out of ammunition yet make a bayonet charge down Little Round Top to save the day, win the battle, and thus preserve the republic. Hollywood is built on the backs of epic storylines such as this.
While the gallantry of Chamberlain's men in the Twentieth Maine and the lesser heralded heroism of Col. Patrick O'Rourke (who was killed leading
In his book Myth and Meaning, anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss wrote that all myths are driven by the need to understand the complexities and mysteries of the human condition.
1 Myths can be venerating, cautionary, didactic, or explanatory; but they always refl ect and embody the cultural beliefs, attitudes, values, and worldviews of a particular people and signify their attempt to make reality comprehensible through narrative. However, so too can myths distort or replace reality and perpetuate illusions within a culture.
Since its release in 1993, the fi lm Gettysburgbased on the Pulitzer Prize-winning book Th e Killer Angels by Michael Shaara-has been a major force in shaping common cultural myths about the Civil War. While the fi lm depicts several storylines, its major narrative centers on the heroism of Gen. Joshua Chamberlain (expertly played by actor Jeff Daniels), who, along with a team of ragtag soldiers from Maine, repulsed Gen. Robert E. Lee's July 2 advance on Little Round Top, thereby protecting the vulnerable Union left fl ank and swinging the fate of the battle and the war. Th e mythos generated around the events on this little rocky hill in South Central Pennsylvania and augmented by other popular works such as Th e Civil War by Ken Burns, contains several compelling narrative elements: a gentle-minded professor of rhetoric fi ghting and defeating the mighty marauding Army of Northern Virginia; a powerful patriotic speech Chamberlain employs to inspire his deserters to return to ranks; the almost mystical serendipity of his regiment being placed on the far left wing minutes before the more than in the ordinary course of aff airs it is capable of accomplishing. " 3 Further, while Lee acknowledged the Army of Northern Virginia was gaining much glory for its battlefi eld accomplishments in 1862 and 1863, the lack of a strategic victory was proving problematic. He believed that the longer the war was prosecuted by the Lincoln administration, the more the logistical disparities would prove fatal to the Confederate cause: "We should not therefore conceal from ourselves that our resources in men are constantly diminishing and the disproportion in this respect between us and our enemies, if they continue united in their eff orts to subjugate us, is steadily augmenting. . . . It seems to me that the most eff ective Alabama altered both the tactical and perhaps strategic design of his commander, General Lee; and we will unpack the role this decision had in the provenance of the popular narrative of the battle. Consequently, our goal will be to situate the heroic actions of Chamberlain and his men in a more historically robust context and thereby invite deeper refl ection on the appropriateness of the myth.
Lee's Strategic Vision
When General Lee calculated his various options for maneuver aft er the Army of Northern Virginia's astonishing victory at Chancellorsville in May 1863, neither overconfi dence nor belief in his army's invincibility played a role. On the contrary, while justifi ably convinced of his army's prowess and proud of what they had hitherto accomplished, Lee coolly and rationally saw the disparity in men and material that existed between the contending forces. On June 10, 1863, Lee consolidated his thoughts in a letter to Confederate president Jeff erson Davis, outlining his rationale for a Northern invasion: "Conceding to our enemies the superiority claimed by them in numbers, resources, and all the means and appliances for carrying on the war. . . . While making the most we can of the means of resistance we possess, and gratefully accepting the measure of success with which God has blessed us . . . it is nevertheless the part of wisdom to carefully measure and husband our strength, and not to expect from it fi eld, having spent the night camped at Marsh Creek "four miles from Gettysburg, " so a determination of where to place him had to be made. 6 In the absence of Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart's trusted cavalry, Lee sent out three scouting parties to the extreme Confederate right in order to determine the strength of the Federal line and its vulnerability for an attack "under Colonel Long, General Pendleton and Captain Johnston, his engineer. "
7 Of these, "Captain Johnston's reconnaissance had the greatest impact. " 8 Th ere are many mysteries associated with Capt. Samuel Johnston's scouting mission in the morning hours of July 2; foremost was why the scouting party failed "to detect Federal units in the area between the Peach Orchard and the Round Tops and on the lower end of Cemetery Ridge, it was somehow the victim of grave misfortune. "
9 As a result, Lee formulated his battle plan "based on the belief that the Federal presence in the Peach Orchard was minimal. "
10
Relying on this faulty intelligence, Lee explained in his offi cial report, "It was determined to make the principal attack upon the enemy's left , and endeavor to gain a position from which it was thought that our artillery could be brought to bear with eff ect. Lee believed the elevated ground of the Peach Orchard area was the perfect artillery platform to continue his attack on Cemetery Ridge and quite probably on to Cemetery Hill.
12 Even today, as one walks up the Wheatfi eld Road, it is quite evident that the Peach Orchard sits on high ground and commands the fi eld in its front. Unfortunately for Lee, aft er being pounded by Confederate artillery from the heights of Hazel Grove during the battle of Chancellorsville, Maj. Gen. Daniel Sickles, commander of the Army of the Potomac's Th ird Corps, observed the same terrain and came to an identical conclusion about its expediency to the Rebels. Sick-mode of accomplishing this objective, now within our reach, is to give all the encouragement we can, consistently with the truth, to the rising peace party of the North. " 4 Lee reached the conclusion that if the Confederacy took a defensive approach, it would merely be a question of time and attrition before it was defeated. Th erefore, the only sound alternative was for the Army of Northern Virginia to take the strategic offensive and defeat the Federal Army of the Potomac on Northern soil. In early June 1863, Lee ordered his three Confederate corps to begin the long trek north from their base at Fredericksburg and commence the Northern invasion. Th e Federal Army of the Potomac tracked their movements northward, and the two powerful armies would ultimately collide in the small Pennsylvania town of Gettysburg.
Gettysburg Day Two: Lee Formulates His Plan
Aft er Lee's resounding, if incomplete, victory on July 1, in the northern outskirts of Gettysburg, the Union army fell back on the heights south of the town and began to form the well-known fi shhook defensive line. Lee pondered his alternatives and decided, as always, to maintain the initiative and look for a way to follow up his success of the previous day. Given the strategic imperative facing the Confederacy, Lee believed he had no choice but to continue to press the attack, even though he faced a battlefi eld that was of the enemy's choosing. Lee's evaluation of the available alternatives was summarized in his offi cial report: "[T]o withdraw through the mountains with our extensive trains would have been diffi cult and dangerous. At the same time we were unable to await an attack, as the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies in the presence of the enemy. . . . A battle had, therefore, become in a measure unavoidable, and the success already gained gave hope for a favorable issue. "
5
As is well established in the historical account, Lee ultimately was persuaded to allow Lt. Gen. Richard Ewell's Second Corps to continue to anchor the Confederate left fl ank while Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill's Th ird Corps occupied the ground to Ewell's right, parallel to the Emmitsburg Road. Lt. Gen. James Longstreet's First Corps was just arriving on the battle-was abandoned, the corps was marched south and was placed in reserve to the rear of the Union left , near the boulder-strewn hill now enshrined as Little Round Top.
13

Hood Redeploys
Meanwhile, Lee's plan for the First Corps appeared uncomplicated: fi nd the enemy's left fl ank, drive it in toward Cemetery Ridge, and capture the Peach Orchard area to use as an artillery platform. However, as Longstreet arrived at the presumed attack point, an immediate adjustment had to be made in the plan due to Sickles's disruptive move into the Peach Orchard. By all accounts, General Lee was 13 Pfanz, Gettysburg, 40, 62. les defi ed commanding general George Meade's orders to remain on Cemetery Ridge and pushed his corps forward, anchoring his left near Devil's Den and extending his right to the Emmitsburg Road north of the Peach Orchard.
As for the Fift h Corps and Chamberlain's Twentieth Maine, they had not crossed the Mason-Dixon Line until July 1. Th ey had undertaken a long day's march in midnineties-degree heat and were camped at Hanover when ordered to Gettysburg that evening around 7:00 p.m. Th e corps began their march at sunrise, reaching the battlefi eld in the early morning hours of July 2, when they were immediately ordered to participate in Meade's contemplated attack on the Confederate left . When this plan 19 Again, the directive was given to maintain contact with the brigade to the right while guiding up the Emmitsburg Road. Formed in battle line behind Law's brigade was the brigade of Brig. Gen. Henry Benning, and to Benning's left was the brigade of Brig. Gen. George (Tige) Anderson. 20 Benning's orders in the reserve line behind Law were given to him directly by General Hood: "I was informed by Major General Hood that his division, as the right of Lieutenant-General Longstreet's corps, was about to attack the left of the enemy's line and that in the attack my brigade would follow Laws [sic] brigade at the distance of about 400 yards. " 21 Benning's orders seemed relatively straight-in the area, and it is most likely that he personally approved or saw to the realignment and direction of the attack himself.
14 Th e alignment of Longstreet's corps was now altered, but the basic plan remained the same: fi nd the enemy's left fl ank and drive it in. Brig. Gen. Joseph Kershaw of McLaws's division describes the alteration that occurred as Hood's division was marched around McLaws's to seek the Army of the Potomac's left fl ank: "Hood's division was then moving in our rear toward our right to gain the enemy's left fl ank, and I was directed to commence the attack so soon as General Hood became engaged swinging around toward the Peach Orchard, and at the same time establishing connection with Hood, on my right, and co-operating with him. " forward: to guide on Law and follow him into battle. Yet in the fog of war, they would prove anything but simple.
The Attack on Little Round Top
Tactically, Lee's plan envisioned an unbroken and cohesive line of battle that would guide on the Emmitsburg Road and roll up the Army of the Potomac's left fl ank. Longstreet's attack swept through what today has become a swath of legendary landmarks: the Stony Hill, Devil's Den, the Wheatfi eld, the Peach Orchard, the Triangular Field, the Valley of Death, to name but a few. Yet because of the powerful mythos created over the last several pants their new roles in the army. Longstreet, in a somewhat understated manner, characterized the situation in his offi cial report: "General Hood received a severe wound soon aft er getting under fi re and was obliged to leave the fi eld. Th is misfortune occasioned some delay in our operations. "
27 With the advantage of historical perspective, Troy Harmon elaborates on Longstreet's comments with an even more pointed and resolute analysis: "Brigadier General Law, did not immediately assume command, leaving a power vacuum and lack of direction for the troops. In the absence of overall control, decision making devolved to subordinate unit commanders. "
28
As Oates advanced, his Fift eenth Alabama regiment was in the center of Law's brigade. When Oates's regiment encountered Col. Hiram Berdan's Second United States Sharpshooters, the annoyance of their fi re "lured the Alabamians in that direction. "
29 As Oates himself reported, "My regiment occupied the center of the brigade when the line Law was suddenly thrust into division command, while brigade command descended on Col. William Oates of the Fift eenth Alabama. 24 Law's brigade had been detached from the First Corps and stationed in the rear of the army at New Guilford twenty-fi ve miles from the battlefi eld. Th ey had remained there until being ordered forward on July 2 at about 3:00 a.m. to march to the battlefi eld, where, upon arrival, they were immediately commanded to rejoin Longstreet on his march to the Union left fl ank.
25
Th e brigade-almost assuredly dehydrated from the summer heat and arduous march-was ordered into battle without water, as a detail sent to fi ll canteens failed to return.
26
Th e problem was compounded due to the natural diffi culty of communicating to the partici- Consequently, Oates's failure to obey the direct order to wheel left pulled a large part of General Robertson's brigade into the battle for Little Round Top, while Law was ordering Oates's regiments to wheel in order to avoid that confrontation.
General Lee's view of the Round Tops on both the second and third days at Gettysburg was summarized in his offi cial report: "General Longstreet 33 or, 27.2:392. 34 or, 27.2:404. of battle was formed. During the advance, the two regiments on my right were moved by the left fl ank across my rear, which threw me on the extreme right of the whole line. I encountered the enemy's sharpshooters posted behind a stone fence, and sustained some loss thereby. " 30 Oates's chase of Berdan took his own Fift eenth and the Forty-Seventh Alabama, situated on the Fift eenth's left , to the extreme right of the Confederate battle line, where they would remain during the course of that day's battle. Th is preoccupation with Berdan may have been an overreaction. As Harry Pfanz observes, "Th e fi re of the retreating sharpshooters did little real damage to the Alabama line. " 31 Still, Oates was drawn inexorably into the vortex of the Round Tops. General Law withdrew the Forty-Fourth and Forty-Eighth Alabama Regiments, which had previously been on the extreme right, and sent them to the left to fi ll a widening gap in the Confederate line to address a threat from Union battery fi re that the brigade was encountering. Law now placed Oates in command of both the Fifteenth and Forty-Seventh Regiments, which now composed the extreme right end of the Confederate battle line. of one full brigade-while seven of Longstreet's brigades were attacking elsewhere speaks volumes as to the importance of the Round Tops as a target. In hindsight it would seem that if being attacked in reverse was a real problem, then refusing the line or keeping a force in perhaps Devil's Den aft er it was captured could have better served the Confederate army. Additionally, if Oates had been attacked in reverse, General Benning was following in reserve and could have fl anked a Federal fl anking force by his own attack in reverse.
Moreover, it is necessary to ask what Oates was going to do with Little Round Top had he managed to capture it. Th ere were no other troops prepared to reinforce him, as the rest of the First Corps was engaged in brutal fi ghting; and Maj. Gen. George Pickett's division-Longstreet's lone remaining force-had not yet arrived on the battlefi eld. Additionally, the entire Union Sixth Corps had reached the battlefi eld directly to the east of Little Round Top "in midaft ernoon" and certainly could have was delayed by a force occupying the high rocky hills on the enemy's extreme left , from which his troops could be attacked in reverse as they advanced. His operations had been embarrassed the day previous by the same cause. "
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It would seem obvious from Lee's offi cial report that he never contemplated that the "high rocky hills" were in any way an objective for his fl ank attack. In fact, Lee wrote that the preoccupation with Little Round Top "embarrassed" the attack. Th e Confederate attack force was pulled to the right; and when a remedial order was given by Brigadier General Law, Colonel Oates chose to ignore it, thereby depriving the primary attack of six 
Conclusion
Ultimately, the powerful dramatizations of Colonel Chamberlain's victory at Little Round Top are treasured cultural artifacts that have engendered popular interest in the Civil War and made the four-year struggle accessible to new generations. However, from a purely historical standpoint, the mythos these works have collectively created around the craggy igneous outcropping in Pennsylvania is not entirely justifi ed and, in fact, serves as a cautionary tale for historians of the Civil War. While stories of heroism emerging from this great struggle are indeed intriguing and while historical accounts of the events that unfolded from 1861-1865 oft en contain the thrilling narrative cadence of dramatic fi ction, there is a need for more critical scholarship that is less prone to the apotheosis of individual fi gures. Certainly, as is the case with Little Round Top, the complexity of the reality is just as compelling as the venerable myth, if not more so.
Contemporary social critics have interrogated the tendency of American culture to privilege the fabricated, inauthentic, and theatrical above the natural and genuine-to convert reality into stage- craft . 41 Certainly, the valorization of Chamberlain on Little Round Top can be seen as an example of this dynamic at work: history fi ltered through the aggrandizing lens of Hollywood. However, as experts such as the late Joseph Campbell have powerfully argued, myths are regenerated in every generation, and thus no story or history is ever immutable. 42 Th us, with regard to future scholarship, we urge students of the battle to embrace a responsibility to promote less simplistic narratives and to redress the misapprehensions perpetuated by more facile renderings of the war's events. Equally, artists and storytellers can create works for public dissemination that refl ect more accurately the complex narrative of history and still retain wide commercial appeal. Th e deeds of these remarkable men who fought the Civil War need not be trumped up beyond their actual impact, as their true heroism matches-and perhaps exceeds-any story, myth, or illusion that fi ction can conjure.
